A right to have a vote and Multiwinner Monotonicity

It seems plausible to equate the idea of equal suffrage with the idea that the power of all ballot papers be inside of the range 0 to 1. A power of 1 is when it is only just possible to get a positive sum of FPTP papers of the same weight to obtain the same winner or the same satisfaction number (e.g. the satisfaction of (ABC) with (Winners={A,C}) is 0.101 (base 2). There is a multiwinner version of monotonicity that moves 2 ordered groups of preferences through each other without having a preference pass over the end of the paper. (See also [[Suffrage]], [[International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights]], Article 25(b): http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_ccpr.htm).

Single Transferable Vote is failed by monotonicity

Also the 2 winner 4 candidate (Meek) STV ([[Single Transferable Vote]])) method fails monotonicity with 16.6% of the papers being involved in the defect, as this example shows:

ACB:16668,BA:16667,CB:33331,D:33334, Winners={A,D}
ACB:33333,BA:16667,CB:16666,D:33334, Winners={B,D}